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Out of  the Building, into the Fire:  
An Analysis of  Cognitive Biases during Entrepreneurial Interviews  
 
Tianxu Chen  
Mark Simon  
John Kim  
Brian Poploskie  
A 
 major source of failure for new ventures is the 
entrepreneurs’ misunderstanding of the product-
market fit. Recently, researchers have suggested 
that to get a better understanding of the product-
market fit, entrepreneurs should “get out of the building” and 
interview many customers. This approach, while advantageous, 
is not without drawbacks. This article presents a conceptual 
model that incorporates the characteristics of “getting out of the 
building” to conduct customer interviews, and the biases that 
can arise to influence the entrepreneurs’ misjudgment of the 
product-market fit. We provide recommendations to overcome 
these biases.  
Keywords:  biases; interview; entrepreneur; product-
market fit; opportunity identification  
 
Virtually every study of product success has con-
firmed the positive relationship between understand-
ing customers’ needs and new product performance 
(Bharadwaj, Nevin, and Wallman, 2012). Cooper 
(1979) goes so far as to state that the failure to un-
derstand customer needs “spells disaster.” The rela-
tionship between business success and understand-
ing the market is especially important for startups. 
Indeed, entrepreneurs often target new markets with 
innovative technologies and novel business ideas 
(Navis and Glynn, 2010). In spite of the opportuni-
ties associated with this strategy, they face two fun-
damental changes. First, the market spaces that they 
choose to enter are often “untested and incomplete-
ly understood” (Navis and Glynn, 2010; Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986: 444); in such markets, custom-
ers’ needs and preferences are often characteristically 
ambiguous (Navis and Glynn, 2010). Second, entre-
preneurs in general lack knowledge about the mar-
kets for their products and often are unable to pro-
duce outputs that satisfy customer needs, thereby 
having a high possibility of dissolution (Stuart, Ha, 
and Hybels, 1999). As a result, developing reliable 
means to understand the product-market fit be-
comes the forefront in the strategy of entrepreneuri-
al firms (Blank, 2013).  
Yet, venture founders often fail to understand 
the market correctly, resulting in the demise of their 
startups (Bhide, 1994; Gruner and Homburg, 2000). 
Some (e.g., Bhide, 1994; Blank, 2013; Sykes and 
Dunham, 1995) suggest that this deficiency stems 
from how entrepreneurs investigate ideas. Tradition-
ally, entrepreneurs engage in extensive up-front 
planning, in which they describe the target market, 
develop a comprehensive distribution strategy, and 
lay out five years of financial projections. They tend 
to rely primarily on secondary data and/or survey 
responses, operating in a “stealth mode” by keeping 
their ideas carefully hidden (Blank, 2013). These 
techniques, however, do not generate a deep under-
standing of customer needs (Daghfous, Ashill, and 
Rod, 2013) and, at best, serve as rough surrogates 
for personal interactions with the customers (Gorry 
and Westbrook, 2011). As a result, entrepreneurs 
may develop incorrect assumptions about custom-
ers, miss opportunities, and lock their startups onto 
a fatal path (Bhide, 1994).  
In response, authors (e.g., Blank, 2013; 
Ries, 2011) have introduced a host of new 
methodologies whereby managers directly hear 
the voice of the customer (VOC). VOC refers 
to “a complete set of customer wants and 
needs, expressed in the customer’s own lan-
guage, organized the way the customer thinks 
about, uses, and interacts with the product . . . 
and prioritized by the customer in terms of 
both importance and performance . . . [in rela-
tion to] existing alternatives” (Bharadwaj et al., 
2012; Katz, 2002: 170). An effective way to 
capture VOC is to interview customers 
(Bharadwaj et al., 2012). Such interviews are 
particularly useful for entrepreneurs because 
they focus on customer needs and problems, 
occur early and often, and take place in the 
customers’ natural environments. Indeed, lead-
ing institutions of higher education, such as 
Babson, Harvard, Stanford, Darden, University 
of Michigan, and dozens more now stress the 
technique (Blank, 2013).  Authors of bestsel-
ling entrepreneurship books suggest the VOC 
can be captured by getting “out of the build-
ing” to talk to potential purchasers (Blank, 
2013; Ries, 2011). The process centers on 
1
Chen et al.: Out of the Building, into the Fire: An Analysis
Published by DigitalCommons@SHU, 2015
 60   New England Journal of Entrepreneurship 
gathering real, actionable, and timely data, and 
often generates more than 100 interviews with-
in a few months (Blank, 2013).  Indeed, more 
than 100 entrepreneurship groups in dozens of 
countries, often comprised of thousands of 
members, have begun stressing the importance 
of the interview.  
These  interviews, however, can potentially gen-
erate major judgment errors (e.g., Adams and Hub-
likar, 2010; Bharadwaj et al., 2012; Cooper, Edgett, 
and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Cooper and Dreher, 2010) 
and such errors are compounded if the interviews 
are conducted by entrepreneurs. Indeed, research 
has shown that entrepreneurs tend to have greater 
cognitive biases than nonentrepreneurs (Busenitz 
and Barney, 1997; Keh, Der Foo, and Boon, 2002; 
Simon and Houghton, 1999). For example, Busenitz 
and Barney (1997) found entrepreneurs have a high-
er degree of overconfidence than managers do. 
Krueger and Brazeal (1994) provided evidence that 
entrepreneurs have higher illusion of control and 
tend to overlook real obstacles. These biases fre-
quently arise in assessing markets (Mattei and Helle-
busch 2006), deciding to launch a venture (Simon 
and Houghton, 1999; Simon, Houghton, and Aqui-
no, 2000), and identifying opportunities (Keh et al, 
2002), the exact situations startups face. The judg-
ment errors associated with these cognitive biases 
may lead to inaccurate understanding of product-
market fit in face-to-face interviews, resulting in less 
rational, less comprehensive decision making. 
In this article, we offer a theoretical framework 
about the antecedents of potential cognitive biases 
that may arise in face-to-face interviews and the role 
it plays in the judgment of product-market fit. Prod-
uct-market fit is defined as being in a good market 
with a product that can satisfy that market 
(Andreessen, 2007), and is not a typical outcome 
variable examined in the entrepreneurial cognition 
research.  However, recent lean startup movement 
has emphasized the importance of product-market 
fit in the success of a new startup (Blank, 2013). An-
dreessen (2007) suggests that all successful startups 
are the ones that have reached product-market fit, 
and getting to product-market fit should be the ulti-
mate goal of a startup. Blank (2013) also echoes this 
sentiment in his lean startup model. He argues that 
entrepreneurs should first engage in customer dis-
cover interviews to isolate customer needs and then 
conduct customer validation interviews to determine 
that the proposed product will meet those needs. He 
further explains that the goal of both of these steps 
is to achieve better product-market fit. Product-
market fit, which is not a typical outcome variable in 
entrepreneurial cognitive research, should be stud-
ied, and may provide a valuable contribution to the 
entrepreneurial cognitive research literature. In fact, 
not achieving product-market fit may be the primary 
reason why new ventures have poor performance 
and even fail (Blank, 2013). 
Our theoretical model, drawing on the infor-
mation processing theory (Pech and Cameron, 
2006), examines how the way entrepreneurs gather 
information may influence the cognitive biases aris-
ing in face-to-face interviews. Indeed, while cogni-
tive biases may exist in different forms, their pres-
ence, magnitude, and consequences may be a func-
tion of the way entrepreneurs obtain information 
(Simon and Houghton, 2002; Zacharakis and Shep-
herd, 2001). Given this, many scholars have called 
for research focusing on how best to conduct the 
interview process (e.g., Adams and Hublikar, 2010; 
Cooper et al., 2004; Gorry and Westbrook, 2011; 
Harmancioglu, Grinstein, and Goldman, 2010).  
Our article contributes to the literature and man-
agerial practice by answering these calls. First, we 
strive to identify which biases, including ones not 
previously discussed in the entrepreneurship litera-
ture, are likely to be exhibited by entrepreneurs dur-
ing interviews, the underlying theoretical mecha-
nisms, and the strategies to manage these biases. 
Second, we believe that the article also contributes 
to the literature on entrepreneurial cognition.  While 
several papers have suggested that entrepreneurial 
environments, in general, lead entrepreneurs to ex-
hibit cognitive biases (Busenitz and Barney, 1997), it 
is rare that a research on entrepreneurship takes a 
finer grain approach by suggesting specific charac-
teristics that are associated with specific biases.  
Thirdly, the paper makes a contribution to theory by 
relating biases to an important and growing entre-
preneurial practice, namely interviewing large num-
bers of individuals.  Finally, the article’s propositions 
contribute to the emerging research on VOC. 
This article proceeds as follows: we first offer an 
overview of the theory that grounds our research 
model. We then introduce our propositions based 
on our theoretical framework, followed by a few rec-
ommendations to tackle the challenges associated 
with interviews. We conclude our article by revisiting 
the key takeaways of this research and directions for 
future research. 
Theoretical Framework 
Information Processing Theory and  
Diagnostic Cues 
We use information processing theory, the dominant 
paradigm within cognitive psychology (Pech and 
Cameron, 2006), to explore the method by which 
entrepreneurs gather information that may influence 
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the cognitive biases arising in face-to-face interviews. 
The fundamental assumption underlying the theory 
is that individuals have limited ability to process in-
formation. Examining information processing as it 
relates to entrepreneurship is particularly relevant 
because it helps explain how individuals identify and 
evaluate opportunities (Pech and Cameron, 2006) 
and is one of the major factors that differentiate en-
trepreneurs from managers (Kaish and Gilad, 
1991).As explained by Mitchell et al. (2004), examin-
ing how information processing relates to these is-
sues is crucial to advancing the entrepreneurship 
field. This has led Singh and Ronch (2011) to assert 
that understanding how entrepreneurs process infor-
mation may help to unlock important aspects of new 
venture creation. 
An inherent component of information pro-
cessing theory relates to the processing of diagnostic 
cues in order to make decisions (Simon and Hough-
ton, 2003). Diagnostic cues are indicators that are 
present, given one outcome, and absent given the 
alternative outcome (Juslin, 1994).  For example, an 
entrepreneur may grow more convinced that he or 
she should launch a certain product if potential cus-
tomers state they would buy the product (the diag-
nostic cue). In other words, individuals start with 
initial beliefs, but then update those beliefs based on 
cues they receive from the environment (Paul and 
Lancaster, 2007). 
But, individuals do not always process cues ob-
jectively. Instead the cues are “filtered” by the deci-
sion environment, which includes factors such as 
type of cues, amount of cues, and the complexity of 
the cues. These conditions affect whether cues are 
noticed, how they are interpreted, and the extent to 
which they are incorporated into one’s judgments 
(Felício, Caldeirinha, and Rodrigues, 2012). As such, 
decision environment has a major influence on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of decision making 
(Salmon, 2013). 
While the role of decision environment in pro-
cessing cues could actually yield superior results 
(Busenitz and Barney, 1997), this is often not the 
case (Simon and Hougton, 2002).  Decision environ-
ment can lead individuals to utilize cues incorrectly 
in three ways.  First, it may lead to using an irrele-
vant cue. Individuals may treat cues that are not rele-
vant to the decision as though they are relevant 
(Juslin, 1994). In this instance, entrepreneurs may act 
on cues that they believe are associated with success, 
but, which in actuality, are not (Simon and Hough-
ton, 2002). Second, entrepreneurs may place too 
much weight on relevant cues (Pech and Cameron, 
2006).  To clarify this concept, we provide the fol-
lowing hypothetical example. In certain decision en-
vironments, an entrepreneur might conclude that 
his or her product idea can be successful because he 
or she interviewed a hundred people (the popula-
tion) and believes that the majority of them indicat-
ed they would use the product (the cue).  However, 
less than 10 percent of the interviewees may have 
made such a statement. A third and final diagnostic 
error could occur when individuals underestimate 
the diagnostic value of a given cue (Nisbett, Zukier, 
and Lemley, 1981). They may believe that few indi-
viduals indicated they would use their product, 
when in reality many did.  
Importantly, extensive literature has indicated 
that this misuse of cues can lead individuals to em-
ploy specific cognitive biases (Åstebro and Elhedhli, 
2006; Busenitz and Barney, 1997).  For example 
(Simon et al., 2000), when faced with far more cues 
than they can manage, individuals may exhibit the 
availability bias by only using those they can most 
easily recall (Pech and Cameron, 2006).  Similarly, 
when one encounters two contradictory cues, such 
as a qualitative assertion by one person versus quan-
titative statistical evidence summarizing findings 
from many people, he or she is more likely to use 
the qualitative cue over the quantitative one (Keh et 
al., 2002).   
To summarize, the paragraph above suggests 
that the decision environment may lead to the mis-
application of cues, which in turn, may lead to 
cognitive biases.  Following this logic, we will de-
velop eight propositions that examine how the 
characteristic associated with interviewing (the de-
cision environment) may help predict which biases 
an entrepreneur may exhibit, and what might be 
done to minimize the reliance on cognitive biases.   
Information Search Characteristics and Biases 
The philosophy of “getting out of the building” and 
interviewing potential customers opens up the op-
portunity for entrepreneurs to obtain informational 
cues to enrich their decision environment. Howev-
er, the way these cues are processed represents an 
opportunity and a challenge. Indeed, conducting 
early interviews may become the dominant method 
for starting ventures to understand their customers 
(Blank, 2013).  Such interviews may have a greater 
impact on product success than any other single 
product introduction practice (Adams and Hublikar, 
2010), and are one of the strongest factors that sep-
arate the best and worst performers (Cooper et al., 
2004). In particular, the interviewer obtains concrete 
information that is rich in contextual detail, which 
allows him or her to assess better the product-
market fit (Kardes, Cronley, and Kim, 2006; Trope 
and Liberman, 2003). More specifically, the rich, bi-
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directional communication facilitates the transfer of 
complex ideas (Daghfous et al., 2013), which can 
lead to promising startups (Peters and Brush, 1996). 
While startups can accumulate rich, factual, ac-
tionable, and timely data through interviews, such an 
enriched decision environment may be associated 
with a variety of cues that increases the complexity 
of decision making.  Under such circumstances, cog-
nitive biases are likely to arise as “filtering” mecha-
nisms (Busenitz and Barney, 1997; Forbes 2005). 
The cognitive biases may lead the entrepreneur to 
make errors in judgment (Barnes, 1984; Simon and 
Houghton, 2002; Simon et al., 2000). The biases may 
occur because of how the interviews are executed, 
and also because of the characteristics of the inter-
viewing process. Figure 1 represents a model of the 
entrepreneurial interviewing process, and the biases 
that may result from the process. As the model illus-
trates, information search characteristics inherent in 
the interviewing process may lead to biases and may 
result in erroneous judgments. The four search char-
acteristics are (1) interviews that are conducted face-
to-face; (2) interviews that are conducted sequential-
ly; (3) interviews where large numbers of people are 
interviewed; and (4) interviews that are conducted by 
entrepreneurs. In the following section, we develop 
propositions related to each of these search char-
acteristics. 
Proposition Development 
Face-to-Face Interviews  
Entrepreneurs are encouraged to “get of the build-
ing” and interview customers directly. Face-to-face 
interviews provide concrete information versus an 
abstract representation from reports and secondary 
data (Kardes et al., 2006). The concrete and 
firsthand information allows the entrepreneur to gar-
ner more accurate and detailed information that may 
be beneficial in making a judgment of product-
market fit.  For instance, the entrepreneur may read 
a survey report suggesting that customers like the 
potential product. However, by interviewing cus-
tomers face-to-face, the entrepreneur can better de-
termine  the product-market fit because he or she 
not only hears what is said but how it is said (e.g., 
the extent to which the customer was enthusiastic 
and animated). Thus, the face-to-face interview al-
lows for not only cognitive responses, but affective 
and behavioral responses as well (Breckler, 1984). 
Therefore, conducting face-to-face interviews may 
lead to biases that may result in suboptimal judg-
ments. The three potential biases are the (1) saliency 
effect, (2) vividness effect, and (3) reasoning by 
analogy. 
Figure 1. Information Search Characteristics and Biases  
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Saliency Effect. In conducting the face-to-face in-
terview, the entrepreneur is collecting information to 
make a judgment regarding the product-market fit.  
Certain interviews may stand out because a particu-
lar interviewee may be very different from others. 
For example, the interviewee may be attractive, have 
a tattooed face, be humorous, or have a handicap 
that distinguishes him or her from others. In such 
case, the entrepreneur believes the cue provides 
great insight, even though it does not.  More specifi-
cally, the information from the interview may be-
come more salient and hence more readily accessible 
from memory. Although the information may not 
have greater probative value, the accessible infor-
mation may be more likely to be used to form judg-
ments (Herr, Kardes and Kim, 1991). Thus: 
 
Proposition 1: The more salient the characteristics 
of interviewees, the higher the likelihood that the 
entrepreneur will form inaccurate judgments about 
the product-market fit.   
 
Vividness Effect. Saliency effect occurs because of 
the contrast with other interviewees, but vivid infor-
mation is context free (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Viv-
idness effect may occur because the information 
may be emotionally interesting or image provoking. 
For example, in the interview process, the interview-
ee may provide an emotional or interesting anecdote. 
Given that it is anecdotal evidence, the information 
may be specific to that one person and may not be 
informative. However, because that information is 
interesting or evokes emotion, it is more accessible 
from memory and will have a greater effect on the 
entrepreneur’s judgments (Herr et al., 1991; Kisielius 
and Sternthal, 1984). In this way, the diagnostic cues stem-
ming from this interview may influence judgment to a dispro-
portional amount. Thus: 
 
Proposition 2: The more emotional or interesting 
the interviewees, the higher the likelihood that the 
entrepreneur will form inaccurate judgments about 
the product-market fit.   
 
Reasoning by Analogy. Whereas the vividness ef-
fects may lead an entrepreneur to give too much 
weight to a valid cue, if an entrepreneur reasons by 
analogy, he or she may give weight to a cue that is 
not valid. In forming judgments, entrepreneurs tend 
to use reasoning by analogy (Simon and Houghton 
2002; Stumpf and Dunbar, 1991).  Reasoning by 
analogy is the process whereby an entrepreneur uses 
a recognizable cue and makes simple analogies to get 
a better sense of the interview information.  This can 
be especially true in a face-to-face interview where 
there are many vivid and salient cues that can be 
used to generate simple analogies. However, face-
to-face interviews may also lead to greater errors 
in reasoning by analogy because the vivid and sali-
ent cues may be inappropriate and not directly relat-
ed in this context (Gilovich, 1981; Haley and 
Stumpf, 1989). Analogies are often dramatic, sug-
gesting they will be readily recalled.  However, al-
most by definition, they are overly simplistic and 
apply to a slightly different context. For example, a 
potential customer may mention he or she was an 
early adopter of an I-phone because it had a nice 
appearance.  The entrepreneur may become unduly 
encouraged by this cue believing his or her situation 
is analogous because he or she is also offering a 
product that looks nice. However, the success of the 
I-phone may have stemmed from many other fac-
tors, such as Apple’s reputation for innovation or 
the company’s large investment in marketing. Thus: 
 
Proposition 3: In face-to-face interviews, inappro-
priate cues may be used by the entrepreneur in rea-
soning by analogy, and information from interviews 
involving analogy may be disproportionally weighed 
to form inaccurate judgments about the product-
market fit. 
 
Interviews Conducted Sequentially 
In interviewing customers, the entrepreneur usually 
conducts the interviews individually to generate 
fruitful insights into customer needs and problems 
(Kahn, 1990; Roller, 1987). This allows the entre-
preneur to assess better the product-market fit. 
However, conducting individual interviews means 
that the entrepreneur must conduct the interviews 
sequentially. The sequential interview process may 
lead to biases that result in suboptimal judgments 
and wrong decisions. The two potential biases are 
(1) the primacy and recency effect and (2) contrast 
effect. 
 
Primacy and Recency Effect. The sequential in-
terview process means that the entrepreneur inter-
views customers in order, and studies have shown 
that order has an effect on judgment (e.g., Ander-
son, 1965; Hovland, 1957; Miller and Campbell, 
1959). The order effect has been labeled the prima-
cy and recency effect.  The primacy and recency ef-
fect occurs because the initial and the most recent 
information have the greatest effect on judgment 
since they are easier to remember (Miller and Camp-
bell, 1959). This means that cues contained in the earlier 
and later interviews conducted by the entrepreneur 
will have a greater effect on the evaluation of the 
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product-market fit, despite the fact that the infor-
mation from these interviews may have less of a pro-
bative value. Thus: 
 
Proposition 4: In interviewing customers sequen-
tially, earlier and later interviews will have a greater 
effect on the entrepreneur’s judgments and may lead 
to an inaccurate assessment of the product-market 
fit. 
 
Contrast Effect. The sequential interview process 
may also lead to the contrast effect.  Judgments are 
not made in isolation but in relation to a context, 
and contrast effect occurs when judgments are shift-
ed away from the contextual reference point 
(Kenrick and Gutierres, 1980; Brickman, Coates, and 
Janoff-Bulman, 1978).  For example, 50 degrees 
Fahrenheit in February feels warm, while in August 
it feels cold. Thus, the context can affect peoples’ 
judgment. In the situation of the entrepreneur con-
ducting a sequential interview, an interviewee may be 
very negative about the product while others are 
mildly positive. The entrepreneur, by focusing on 
the very negative evaluation, or cue, and using it as 
the reference point, may perceive the mildly positive 
evaluation as extremely positive. This suggests that the 
entrepreneur’s interpretation of the cue may not always be ac-
curate.  More specifically, the overestimation of the 
mildly positive evaluation may lead the entrepreneur 
to form an inaccurate assessment of a product-
market fit. Thus: 
 
Proposition 5: In interviewing customers sequen-
tially, an extreme interview may be used as a refer-
ence point and influence the entrepreneur’s percep-
tion of other interviews, leading to an inaccurate as-
sessment of the product-market fit. 
 
Interviewing Large Numbers of Customers 
Proponents of interviewing (e.g., Blank, 2013) sug-
gest speaking with a large number of customers, so 
the entrepreneur can obtain a substantial amount of 
information and increase the accuracy of the infor-
mation. Although interviewing a large number of 
customers is a good idea, it leads to unwanted conse-
quences if the entrepreneur is not attentive.  It may 
result in (1) overconfidence and (2) dilution effect. 
 
Overconfidence. Accuracy of information can be 
assumed if many customers provide the same infor-
mation. It allows for the possibility of triangulation, 
convergence, and overall corroboration in determin-
ing product-market decisions. However, if the inter-
viewing procedure results in interviews of customers 
that are associated (e.g., the interview takes place in 
the office of one company), the entrepreneur may 
have redundant information. The redundancy of in-
formation means the information is correlated. The 
consequence of the correlated information is that 
the entrepreneur, in reality, is not receiving new in-
dependent information, and the accuracy of the in-
formation may be limited. In other words, the entre-
preneur may treat two cues as though each has dis-
tinct diagnostic value when they do not. This may 
lead to overconfidence.   
Overconfidence is the overestimation of the cer-
tainty of information (Simon and Houghton, 2003). 
Thus, overconfidence is the degree of confidence in 
relation to the accuracy of the information, and may 
lead to errors in judgment (Hayward, Shepherd, and 
Griffin, 2006). If the interviews are from customers 
who are associated, the redundant information in-
creases the certainty but not the accuracy of the in-
formation (Oskamp, 1965). In this case, the entre-
preneur becomes overconfident, and judgments 
about product-market fit may be incorrect. Thus: 
 
Proposition 6: Large numbers of interviews target-
ing customers that are related may introduce redun-
dant information, leading to the entrepreneur’s over-
confidence, thereby resulting in the entrepreneur’s 
inaccurate assessment of the product-market fit.   
 
Dilution Effect. The goal of interviewing custom-
ers is to acquire relevant (i.e., diagnostic) infor-
mation to assess product-market fit. However, not 
all information is the same in diagnostic value (Herr 
et al., 1991; Kardes, Kim, and Lim, 1994). Although 
diagnostic information is critical in forming judg-
ments, nondiagnostic/irrelevant information is use-
less and should not be used. 
When conducting large numbers of interviews, 
the entrepreneur is collecting large amounts of infor-
mation. Some information may be diagnostic and 
some may not. The use of diagnostic information 
results in an accurate judgment about the product-
market fit.  However, when faced with large 
amounts of information, the entrepreneur may try to 
use all information to make the judgment.  However, 
the mere presence of nondiagnostic information will 
reduce the effect of the diagnostic information 
(Nisbett et al., 1981). For example, hypothetically in 
the interviews, the entrepreneur discovered that, on 
average, older customers found the product more 
attractive. The entrepreneur also found that people 
who liked the product slept on average eight hours a 
day, and liked to watch the television program 
Swamp People. The information about how much they 
sleep and what show they watch may be irrelevant, 
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and if so, should have no bearing on the product-
market judgment.  However, the entrepreneur may 
try to overprocess all the information and the effect 
of the diagnostic information (older customer) may 
receive less weight in the product-market fit judg-
ment.  In other words, valid cues may be “lost.” 
Thus: 
 
Proposition 7: Conducting a large number of inter-
views may lead to nondiagnostic information, which 
in turn, may reduce the effect of diagnostic infor-
mation, resulting in an inaccurate assessment of 
product-market fit.  
 
Interviews Conducted by Entrepreneur  
An advantage of having entrepreneurs conduct the 
interviews is that they get firsthand information that 
is not filtered. The information is not based on the 
assumptions, perceptions, or guesstimates of others. 
However, being personally involved may also have a 
negative ramification, giving rise to suboptimal judg-
ments due to biased processing. Biased processing, 
in this case, refers to the tendency to view infor-
mation positively and ignore disconfirming evidence. 
 
Biased processing. Biased processing deals with 
what and how information is processed and inter-
preted to form a judgment. The entrepreneur ex-
ploring a startup opportunity is likely to overestimate 
its strengths (Palich and Bagby, 1995), underestimate 
its weaknesses (Palich and Bagby, 1995), and per-
ceive little risk (Simon et al., 2000). More problemat-
ic is the especially strong tendency of entrepreneurs 
to fail to adjust their beliefs based on feedback 
(Åstebro, Jeffrey, and Adomdza, 2007; Parker, 
2006). This suggests that entrepreneurs may empha-
size interview information that is 
consistent with their initial optimistic 
conclusions, while ignoring infor-
mation that is inconsistent with them 
(Posavac, Kardes, and Brakus, 2010; 
Lee, Acito, and Day, 1987; Lord, 
Ross, and Lepper 1979; San-
bonmatsu, Posavac, Kardes, and 
Mantel, 1998). For example, the en-
trepreneur may believe that a certain 
market fits well with the product. By 
holding this belief, he or she will only 
look for interview information that 
will support that belief. Furthermore, 
interview information that provides 
weak support for that belief may be 
interpreted as strong support. The 
entrepreneur becomes confident, and 
may conclude that he or she was right all along in 
that the product is a good fit for that market.  
The above discussion suggests that entrepre-
neurs will make several errors related to processing 
cues. They might notice a disproportionately large 
number of positive cues and a disproportionately 
small number of negative cues. Furthermore, entre-
preneurs are likely to misinterpret negative or neu-
tral cues as positive. Thus: 
 
Proposition 8: By personally conducting interviews, 
entrepreneurs may process and interpret interview 
information that supports their personal beliefs, re-
sulting in an inaccurate assessment of the product-
market fit. 
 
Discussion 
The approach of “get out of the building and inter-
view real customers” constitutes sound advice with 
many positive advantages. The entrepreneur can 
acquire real, actionable, and timely data. However, it 
is also not without problems. The interviewing pro-
cess may lead to biases that adversely influence the 
quality of a judgment. If the entrepreneur is not 
cognizant of these biases when interviewing cus-
tomers, bad judgments may transpire and lead to 
wrong decisions. Thus, entrepreneurs should follow 
certain procedures in the interviewing process to 
reduce biases. Especially, entrepreneurs are more 
susceptible to cognitive biases than others (Busenitz 
and Barney, 1997; Forbes 2005) and therefore, the 
interviews conducted by them may be particularly 
prone to certain biases. They can, however, reduce 
these by following a few recommendations (Table 1).  
Search Characteristics Biases Recommendations  
Conducted Face-to-Face  Saliency Effect  
Vividness Effect  
Reasoning by Analogy  
Minimize impact of irrelevant 
information;  weigh equally the 
information provided by inter-
viewees; avoid judgment based 
on appearances; audio-tape 
interviews  
Conducted Sequentially  Primacy and Recency Effect  
Contrast Effect  
Review interviews in random 
order  
Large Numbers of People  Overconfidence  
Dilution Effect  
Interviews are from different 
people who are not associated; 
review audio-tape interviews  
Entrepreneur Conducts  Biased Processing  Understand the interview is to 
explore, not to validate  
Table 1. Cognitive Biases and Recommendations  
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Judgment errors might occur due to the saliency 
or vividness effects, and/or the tendency to make ir-
relevant associations. Therefore, it is critical that the 
entrepreneur should minimize the attention paid to 
irrelevant information. Information provided by in-
terviewees who demonstrate higher levels of saliency 
or vividness should be given the same weight as the 
information provided by other interviewees, and the 
entrepreneur should also avoid judging the quality 
of the interviewees’ opinions based on their ap-
pearances. One effective tool to accomplish this is 
audio-taping the interviews. Furthermore, the entre-
preneur should review the interviews in random or-
der to reduce the recency and contrast biases.  Because 
these biases are caused by the order in which the 
entrepreneur conducts interviews, randomization 
can minimize memory issues.   
The entrepreneur should also make sure that 
interviews are from different customers who are not 
associated.  If related customers provide the same 
information, the information may be redundant. Re-
search on the knowledge-based view indicates that 
knowledge redundancy undermines the chance to 
incorporate diverse perspectives and reduces the 
likelihood of creating radical innovation (Makri, Hitt, 
and Lane, 2010). Extending this idea to interviews 
about product-market fit, one may expect that inter-
views conducted in a homogeneous customer group 
might be less valuable because similar information 
might be repeatedly reported. Conclusions about the 
product-market fit could sometimes be misleading if 
the product is targeted to a broader range of cus-
tomers. By contrast, if the entrepreneur involves di-
verse groups of customers in the interviews, he or 
she will have the opportunity to see different cus-
tomer needs and incorporate different opinions 
about the product-market fit.  The interviews may 
therefore generate more insightful discoveries and 
may be more easily generalized.  
Bringing multiple individuals into the decision 
making, and using processes such as devil's advoca-
cy, may be especially effective (Schweiger, Sandberg, 
and Ragan, 1986).  Devil’s advocacy occurs when 
someone takes a position, even if he or she does not 
believe it, that opposes someone else’s conclusion. 
Those advocating the approach believe that the sub-
sequent debate will generate better insight. Also, 
Winkler and Poses (1993) suggested that individuals 
may limit their own biases by writing down all the 
reasons supporting their prediction and all the rea-
sons disconfirming it.   
Finally, the entrepreneur must keep reminding 
himself that the goal of the interview is to explore, 
not validate. The process of validation, in nature, is 
often confirmatory, rather than exploratory; that is, 
when an entrepreneur focuses on validation, he or 
she often tries to seek out information indicating a 
link that is believed to exist, rather than to explore 
the unknown. Thus, if an interview is geared toward 
validation, the entrepreneur typically has already es-
tablished causal reasoning about the product-market 
fit. This could lead, consciously or subconsciously, 
to focusing on information that confirms the initial 
hypothesis, and ignoring information that refutes it. 
This selective inclusion and exclusion of information 
may constrain the entrepreneur’s opportunity to in-
corporate new insights, thus limiting the discovery 
power of the interview. Indeed, entrepreneurship 
research has highlighted that new ventures have a 
competitive advantage because they have less inertia, 
more innovative ideas, and a greater ability to see 
opportunities (Simon and Houghton, 2002). As a 
result, the entrepreneur must always keep an open 
mind in the interview to maximize knowledge acqui-
sition. One particularly effective technique may be to 
focus initially only on objectively observing custom-
er problems, and only afterwards, trying to solve 
them by developing a product or service (Blank, 
2013). 
Limitations and Conclusions 
We acknowledge a limitation of our research. We 
have not parceled out all the possible nuances of the 
complex web of relationships related to characteris-
tics of decision-making contexts and cognitive bias-
es. This would be particularly difficult given that bi-
ases, while distinct, are often closely related to subtle 
differences in mechanisms, which may lead to exhi-
bition of one bias versus another (Hogarth, 1987). 
As Whetten’s (1989) noted, “[It is] unfair to expect 
that theorist be sensitive to all possible boundary 
constraints … in the absence of experimental evi-
dence, we must be realistic regarding the extent of a 
theorist foreknowledge.”  Given the relatively new 
research attention on the intersection of interview-
ing, entrepreneurship, and product-market fit, we 
believe that this investigation may serve as a valuable 
first step toward unraveling all the nuances of the 
relationships.  We fully recognize, however, that this 
article is not an ending point, but hope it provides a 
valuable springboard for those who follow. 
There are several directions for future research 
related to this article that could advance the field.  
First, scholars should empirically test the paper’s 
propositions. Second, exploring whether the asser-
tions in this article apply equally to entrepreneurs 
and managers will increase our understanding of the 
article’s boundary constraints.  Finally, scholars may 
want to uncover the extent to which one of the pro-
posed relationships is stronger than another.  
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In conclusion, the current investigation high-
lights the importance of “getting out of the build-
ing” in the interview process, and acknowledges the 
potential cognitive issues associated with adopting 
this approach. While biases are difficult to eliminate, 
we believe that the suggested remedy techniques 
can, to some extent, reduce their effects in the en-
trepreneurial process.  
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